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Abstract
This paper studies the optimal linear tax-transfer policy in an economy where
agents di¤er in productivity and in genetic background, and where longevity
depends on health spending and genes. It is shown that, if agents internal-
ize imperfectly the impact of genes and health spending on longevity, the
utilitarian social optimum can be decentralized with type-specic redistribu-
tive lump sum transfers and Pigouvian taxes correcting for agentss myopia
(leading to undersaving and underinvestment in health), and for their inca-
pacity to perceive the e¤ect of health spending on the resource constraint of
the economy (causing overinvestment in health). The second-best problem
is also examined under linear taxation instruments. Our main result is that
it may be optimal to tax health spending, in particular under a complemen-
tarity of genes and health spending in the production of longevity.
Keywords: longevity, myopia, genetic background, social security, pater-
nalism.
JEL code: H21, H51, H55, I12, I18.
1 Introduction
Although death is as universal as birth, all humans do not, obviously, have
equal longevities. As this is well-known among demographers, there exist,
even within a given cohort, signicant di¤erentials in the lifetime enjoyed by
people. Demographic studies show that the determinants of longevity di¤er-
entials can be of various kinds, some determinant being under the control of
individuals, whereas others lie outside their control.
The causes of longevity di¤erentials on which agents have some control
are generally named the behavioral determinants of longevity, on the grounds
that it is the agent, by his behavior, who a¤ects his own health and longevity.
Behavioral determinants of longevity are numerous, and consist of all aspects
of individual decisions and lifestyles a¤ecting survival. These include, among
other things, eating (Bender et al, 1998), alcoholism (Peto et al, 1992), and
smoking (Doll and Hill, 1950).1 Individuals can also improve their longevity
through health-improving e¤orts, which can take various forms.2
On the contrary, some causes of longevity di¤erentials lie outside any
control of individuals. Those causes can be classied in two broad groups: on
the one hand, environmental factors, which include all external determinants
of longevity on which agents, taken separately, have little control, and, on
the other hand, genetic factors, on which agents have also no control, but
which are here internal to each agent.3
From the point of view of economic policy, it is straightforward to see
that whether longevity is taken as exogenous or is partly a¤ected by agents
decisions and lifestyles makes a signicant di¤erence.
If longevity di¤erentials are exogenous, the task of the policy-maker,
which consists of comparing agents with di¤erent life expectancies, can be
summarized as follows: all things being equal, should we compensate agents
who have a relatively short life or, on the contrary, should we favor those
who live long and happen to consume more over their lifetime? That ques-
tion admits various answers, depending on the underlying ethical postulates.
For instance, classical utilitarianism, if combined with assumptions such as
additive lifetime welfare and expected utility, justies a redistribution from
1Note that, in the presence of addiction, whether mortality factors like obesity, alco-
holism and drug consumption are under the control of agents or not is questionable.
2Health-improving e¤ort can be either temporal (e.g. physical activity, see Kaplan et
al. 1987), physical (e.g. abstinence of food, see Solomon and Manson, 1997), or monetary
(e.g. health services, see Poikolainen and Eskola, 1986).
3Environmental factors of longevity include the quality of lands (Kjellström, 1986), of
waters (Sartor and Rondia, 1983), and of the air (Kinney and Oskanyak, 1991). Genetic
diseases take various forms, such as the sickle-cell disease and the familial hypercholes-
terolemy (favouring hart attacks) (Soliani and Lucchetti, 2001).
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short-lived agents to long-lived agents.4
But if longevity is behavioral, and can be fostered by, for instance, physi-
cal activity, health spending or an appropriate diet, the policy-maker cannot
design policies without facing additional issues pertaining to individual re-
sponsibility and rationality. When one pays attention to responsibility, the
mere fact that agents inuence their longevities tends to question redistribu-
tion. For instance, in the hypothetical case where longevity would be chosen
by agents, it is not obvious to see why a government should redistribute across
agents according to their longevities. As far as rationality is concerned, it is
obvious that the policy-maker cannot treat similarly a well-informed, fully
rational choice of lifestyle and a badly-informed, myopic behavior. In the
latter case, the government must correct individual myopia, and induce the
behavior - and longevity - that is optimal from a lifetime perspective.
In reality, longevity di¤erentials are neither exogenous to agents, nor cho-
sen by agents, but are of mixed nature: external and behavioral. In addition,
the di¢ culty to decompose longevity di¤erentials into behavioral and exter-
nal components tends to complexify the task of the policy-maker.
The goal of this paper is to examine the issue of the optimal taxation
policy in an economy where individual longevity is inuenced by factors of
the two kinds mentioned above, i.e. by factors on which agents have some
control, and by factors on which they have no control. For that purpose,
we shall set up a two-period model, where the probability of survival from
the rst to the second period of life depends on a private monetary health
e¤ort (rst-period health expenditures) and on an exogenous characteristic of
agents (e.g. genetic background). Moreover, we shall consider a population of
agents heterogeneous on two dimensions: on the one hand, their productivity,
and, on the other hand, their genetic background.
In order to account for the - possibly limited - rationality of agents, we
shall assume that, when being young, agents do not fully internalize the
impact of their health investment on their life expectancy. Note that the
reason why some individuals do not internalize in their behavior the causal
link between nancial e¤orts in the rst period of their life and longevity
can be either ignorance or myopia. But whatever the reason is, this lack of
rationality legitimates the social planner into acting paternalistically. In fact,
our individuals, myopic or ignorant, will be grateful to their government to
have induced them into behaving rationally.
Throughout this paper, our normative analysis will rely on a particu-
lar ethical criterion: classical utilitarianism. It should be emphasized that
4See Bommier (2005) and Bommier et al (2007a,b) on that - somewhat controversial -
corollary of classical utilitarianism.
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this criterion su¤ers, in this particular context, from two main shortcomings.
Firstly, utilitarianism, by relying on consequentialism, can hardly do justice
to intuitions about individual responsibility. The utilitarian social planner
will only consider agentss nal positions (expressed in utilities, through in-
dividual consumptions and longevities), but will not care about how those
positions have been achieved for some initial individual conditions (produc-
tivities and genes). Secondly, classical utilitarianism, by merely summing
agentsutilities, is not fully satisfactory for discussing issues of life and death,
as this presupposes that any life with a strictly positive - even innitely low
- level of utility is worth being lived.5 Undoubtedly, those two shortcomings
make classical utilitarianism a mere benchmark case, or, at most, a starting
point for the study of optimal taxation policy under endogenous longevity.
For convenience, we shall also make here some other signicant simpli-
cations. Firstly, we shall allow for only a single inuence of an agent on
his health - a health expenditure - which is an obvious simplication given
the various ways by which people can inuence their longevity (e.g. physical
e¤ort, etc.). Secondly, we shall concentrate exclusively on the quantity of life
- and leave aside any qualitative concerns - so that health spending can only
a¤ect individual welfare through its impact on longevity, but not otherwise.6
Thirdly, we concentrate here on a static economy, and take the structure of
heterogeneity in genes and productivities as xed.7
Anticipating our main results, we show that, in this rst-best (i.e. with
full information and full availability of policy tools), the social optimum can
be decentralized with type-specic Pigouvian taxes and redistributive lump-
sum transfers. Pigouvian taxes correct for myopia under-saving and under-
investment in health and for the fact that agents do not perceive the impact
of health policy on revenue (as in Becker and Philipson, 1998). Moreover, as
a consequence of utilitarianism, redistribution goes from high productivity
to low productivity agents, and from short-lived to long-lived individuals. In
the second-best problem, where policy instruments are limited to linear taxes
and lump sum transfers, it is shown that the optimal taxes on labour income
5In other words, the critical utility level for existence is set to zero (see Broome, 2004).
6Our focus on longevity-enhancing spendings shall have important consequences when
interpreting the results of this study. In reality, various health expenditures, which have
little relationship with longevity, exhibit a strong redistributive dimension. But whether
such expenditures should be taxed or subsidized lies outside the skope of this paper, which
focuses on longevity-improving health expenditures.
7Thus, this study complements other papers, such as Zhang et al (2006) and Pestieau
et al (2008), which analyse the optimal taxation policy in a dynamic framework, but
without an explicit heterogeneity in longevity-enhancing characteristics. An exception is
Ponthiere (2007), who studies lifestyle-based longevity in a dynamic model where lifestyles
are transmitted vertically or obliqually across generations.
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and health spending are a¤ected by the sign and extent of the covariance
between individual productivity and genetic endowment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
and characterizes the laissez-faire. The social optimum and its decentraliza-
tion are studied in Section 3. The second-best problem is analyzed in Section
4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model and laissez-faire.
Let us consider a two-period model, where all agents live a rst period (of
length normalized to 1) with certainty, but enjoy a second period of life with
a probability .
The economy under study involves a population of agents who are het-
erogeneous in two characteristics: a longevity-a¤ecting characteristic (e.g.
genetic background), and productivity at work. Note that each of those char-
acteristics can inuence individual longevity: while the genetic background
a¤ects the survival probability directly, productivity can also, indirectly, lead
to a higher probability of survival through its impact on private health ex-
penditures.
Assuming the expected utility hypothesis and additive lifetime welfare,
individual preferences can be represented by:8
u (c  v (l)) + u (d) (1)
where c and d denote rst- and second- period consumption, l is the rst
period labour supply and  is the perceived probability of survival. As
usual, u (:) denotes the temporal utility of consumption, with u0 (:) > 0 and
u00 (:) < 0: Finally, the disutility of labour is denoted by v (l) : For simplicity,
v (l) is assumed here to have a quadratic form, l2=2.
The perceived probability of survival to the second period has the follow-
ing form:
(e; ") (2)
where  2 [0; 1] denotes the degree of rationality of the agent, that is, the
extent to which the agent internalizes the impact of health spending e and
genes " on the probability of survival .9 No myopia occurs when  equals
8This expression presupposes no pure time preferences, as well as a utility from being
dead normalized to zero.
9Note that this formalization of myopia is formally equivalent to assuming some pes-
simism of agents, in the sense that, under  < 1, the perceived probability of survival
is always inferior to the actual probability. While this constitutes a simplication, that
modelling of myopia has the virtue of analytical conveniency.
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1, while  tending towards 0 involves a complete ignorance of the impact of
e and " on survival.10
The actual probability of survival  depends on individual characteristic
" (e.g. genetics) and on private health spending, e. We assume e > 0 and
ee < 0: We assume also that " > 0.
Agents of type i are characterized by wi, their wage rate, and "i, their
genetic endowment. The proportion of i in the total population is denoted
by ni. For further use, we write:
i (ei)   (ei; "i) (3)
As the benchmark situation, we will assume both complementarity be-
tween e¤orts and genetics - so that the sign of the cross derivative e" is
positive - and a positive correlation between genes and productivities.11
We now turn to the laissez-faire solution in an economy without gov-
ernment. We assume that individuals invest all their savings on a perfect
annuity market. An agent with type i determines his optimal level of savings
si as well as his optimal level of health expenditure ei by solving the following
problem:
maxu
 
ci   l2i =2

+ ii (ei)u (di)
s.t.

ci = wili   si   ei
di = siRi
where Ri is the return of savings. First order conditions yield
li = wi (4)
u0 (xi) = u0 (di)Riii (ei) (5)
u0 (xi) = i0i (ei)u (di) (6)
where xi = ci   v (li) denotes the value of net consumption in period 1. We
assume that the market for annuities is actuarially fair, so that
Ri =
1
i (ei)
where the interest rate is assumed to be zero for simplicity. Note that the
return of the annuity depends on the true survival of the individual. Condi-
tion (5) denes the preferred level of savings. If the individual is perfectly
10That situation is quite unrealistic: in that case, agents would not invest in health.
11We will discuss the implications of those assumptions throughout this paper.
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rational, i = 1, and consumption is smoothed (i.e. xi = di); on the con-
trary, for any i < 1, rst period consumption is preferred, as the individual
underestimates his probability of survival.
Equation (6) determines the optimal level of health investment. Note
that if i ! 0, the agent does not invest in health and ei ! 0.12 Moreover,
in the laissez-faire, the agent takes the return of the annuity as given and
does not internalize the impact of health spending on the annuity return. As
a consequence, the laissez-faire level of health expenditures will be shown to
be higher than the optimal one.13
3 Optimum and decentralization
Let us now characterize the social optimum in the economy under study. For
that purpose, we shall assume that the social planner is a standard classical
utilitarian planner (i.e. a Benthamite planner), whose goal is the mere max-
imization of the sum of individual utilities. As this is well-known among
normative philosophers, utilitarianism, by relying on the consequentialist
postulate, constitutes an ethical basis that leaves aside issues of individual
responsibility.14 Moreover, the classical form of utilitarianism exhibits vari-
ous limitations in the context of endogenous longevity (see Broome, 2004).15
Hence, classical utilitarianism is used here as a mere benchmark case.
Throughout this section, it is assumed that the planner perfectly observes
individualstype. We also adopt a paternalistic approachin that the social
planner corrects individuals self-control problems. In the following, we rst
study the centralized optimum and then how to implement it through a tax-
and-transfer scheme.
12Assuming i = 0 yields that si = ei = 0 so that the results of this paper collapse.
13This imperfection was rstly highlighted by Becker and Philipson (1998). When choos-
ing their longevity e¤orts, agents face a free rider problem, in the sense that each individual
chooses his longevity e¤ort without taking into account that his own e¤ort a¤ects the an-
nuity price.
14A concern for responsibility implies that one pays attention, to some extent, to the
relation between the initial conditions in which agents are and their nal positions. Here
the social planner has, as a unique objective, the maximization of the sum of utilities
(which, under welfarism, are the unique relevant pieces of information for positions). That
maximization problem is only constrained by survival functions and utility functions, and,
thus, does not pay a specic attention to how conditions and positions are related.
15The di¢ culties raised by varying longevity include, among other things, the denition
of a critical utility level for existence, making the addition of a new person with a life
yielding that utility level neutral from a social point of view. In the following, we rely on
classical utilitarianism, where that critical level is xed to zero.
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3.1 Centralized solution
We assume that a paternalistic government would like to correct for individ-
uals myopia. Thus, the paternalistic government takes i = 1 in its objective
and chooses consumption paths as well as health spending in order to maxi-
mize X
ni
 
u
 
ci   l2i =2

+ i (ei)u (di)

subject to the resource constraint of the economyX
ni (ci + ei + i (ei) di   wili)  0 (7)
First order conditions for this problem can be rearranged so that
li = wi (8)
u0(xi) = u0(di) =  (9)
0i (ei)u(di) =  [1 + di
0
i (ei)] (10)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint. First
order condition on labour results from the assumption of quadratic disutil-
ity of labor. Condition (9) indicates that consumption should be smoothed
between periods and across individuals, i.e. xi = di = d: This is a direct im-
plication of both utilitarianism and of additivity across periods in individual
lifetime utility.
We now rewrite condition (10) as
0i (ei) =
F
1  dF
where F = u0 (d) =u (d) 8i is a measure of risk aversion, called the fear of
ruin (see Eeckhoudt and Pestieau, 2008). This function F measures the
concavity of the utility of consumption, and it is generally assumed that dF
is lower than 1. Comparing it with its laissez-faire counterpart, (6), where
0i (ei) = F=i, this condition di¤ers on two grounds. For ease of exposure,
let us rst assume that i = 1; in that case, the rst best FOC di¤ers from
the laissez-faire FOC (6) by a 1=1   dF > 1, which can be related to the
impact of health e¤ort on the budget set. This is the Becker-Philipson
e¤ect: as opposed to the laissez-faire, the social planner takes into account
that increasing health e¤ort decreases consumption possibilities (through the
budget constraint), so that the rst best level of health e¤ort is always lower
than the laissez-faire one.16 Thus, this rst e¤ect tends to lower the rst best
16See Becker and Philipson (1998).
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level of e¤ort with respect to the laissez-faire. Yet, this rst best expression
also di¤ers from the laissez-faire by 1=i. In the rst best, the impact of
e¤ort on survival is fully internalized; this contributes to make the rst best
e¤ort exceed its laissez-faire level. Since both e¤ects (Becker-Philipson and
myopia) go in opposite directions, whether the rst best level of e¤ort is
superior or inferior to the laissez-faire one is not clear.
Note that in the rst best, e¤ort is di¤erentiated according to genetic
backgrounds, "i but not with respect to the degree of rationality of indi-
viduals, i. Assuming in a paternalistic way that i = 1 for every type
leads the social planner to redistribute only according to individuals genetic
background and productivity (which individuals are not responsible for).
Our results on the rst best allocation are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 Assume two types of individuals with productivity and ge-
netic characteristic (wi; "i). In the benchmark situation where w1 < w2 and
"1 < "2 and where e and " are complements, the rst best allocation implies:
(i) xi = di = d; i = 1; 2,
(ii) l1 = w1 < l2 = w2,
(iii) e1 < e2.
Note that assuming substituability between e¤orts and genetics, one would
obtain the opposite result that ei > ej whenever "i < "j.
3.2 Decentralization
Let us now consider how the paternalistic optimum can be decentralized. In
the following, we assume that the set of instruments available to the social
planner include proportional taxes on earnings,  i, on health spending, i,
and on savings, i, as well as lump sum transfers Ti. The annuity market is
still assumed to be actuarially fair: Ri = 1=i (ei) at equilibrium.
The individuals problem is thus to maximize:
u
 
wi (1   i) li   si (1 + i)  ei (1 + i) + Ti   l2i =2

+ ii (ei)u (Risi)
The rst order conditions of the above problem are:
li = wi (1   i)
iu
0 (di)
u0 (ci)
= 1 + i (11)
u0 (ci) (1 + i) = i0i (ei)u (di) (12)
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Comparing these FOCs with the rst best FOCs, (8)   (10), we can
calculate the values of our tax instruments. Let rst assume that i = 1.
We have:
 i = i = 0
i =  =
dF
1  dF > 0
If individuals are myopic, i < 1, so that we keep  i = 0, but now
i = i   1 < 0
i =
i   1 + dF
1  dF 7 0
Thus, under a myopia di¤ering across individuals, the decentralization of
the social optimum requires individualized Pigouvian subsidies on savings,
and individualized Pigouvian taxes or subsidies on health spending. The
intuition behind those results is the following. Since a myopic agent does
not save enough in the laissez-faire, it is optimal to subsidize his savings
(i   1 < 0), in order to encourage savings and to correct for the e¤ect of
myopia. Note that if individuals were all identically myopic (i.e. i =  < 1
8i), it would follow that the subsidy on savings would be equal for all agents
(i.e. i =  8i).
Concerning the sign of i, it is straightforward to see that if i = 1 (no
myopia), i =  is strictly positive, so that health spending is taxed uniformly
on all agents. This is simply due to the correction of the Becker-Philipson
e¤ect: in order to reduce agentss health investment towards its optimal
level, one has to tax health expenditures. On the contrary, in the presence
of some myopia (i.e. if i < 1), the optimal tax on health may turn into
a subsidy, which is type-specic (as this depends on i). There exist two
countervailing e¤ects: on the one hand, a tax would be necessary to correct
for the free riderproblem, but, on the other hand, one needs a subsidy to
correct for individual myopia. Depending on the strength of the two e¤ects,
the individualized tax on health spending i is positive or negative.17
Regarding lump sum transfers Ti, let us rst study the direction of tranfers
in the benchmark case where productivities and genetic backgrounds are
positively correlated, and where health e¤orts and genes are complementary
inputs in the production of longevity. Thus, under those assumptions, we
have two individuals 1 and 2 with positively correlated types such that w1 <
w2 and "1 < "2, and a complementarity between "i and ei in the production
17Note also that if i =  < 1 8i, it would follow that i =  8i.
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of longevity i 8i = 1; 2. The net transfer Ti can be expressed as
Ti = ci +  (ei) di + ei   wili
that is, total spending minus earning. We know that d1 = d2 = d, and that
c1   w21=2 = c2   w22=2 = d:
Hence,
Ti =  (ei) d+ d+
w21
2
+ e1   w21
= d (1 +  (e1)) + e1   w
2
1
2
In the benchmark case, T1 7 T2 and the direction of transfers is ambigu-
ous. If instead of complementarity we had substituability, then "2 < "1 and
we would have unambiguously
T1 =  T2 > 0:
4 The linear tax problem
Having characterized the social optimum and its decentralization under a full
set of policy instruments, let us now consider the problem of a social planner
who has only a limited set of policy instruments available. As above, the
planner faces a society of agents with di¤erent genetic characteristics "i and
di¤erent productivities wi. However, for simplicity, all agents are assumed,
throughout this section, to be equally myopic (i = ).
The second-best framework studied here is characterized by the restricted
availability of policy instruments, which, in addition, are not individualized.18
Actually, our set of available instruments will here include: constant tax rates
on earnings  and (private) health expenditure , a rst-period lump sum
transfer T (i.e. a demogrant), and a at rate pension benet, P .
Furthermore, in order to be closer to reality - where annuity markets
remain, for various reasons, underdeveloped -, we shall assume here that
there exists no annuity market.19 As this is well-known, the non-existence of
annuities imply accidental bequests. For simplicity, it is assumed that those
bequests are taxed at a 100 % rate.20
18In comparison with the instruments used in the decentralization section, we shall
assume here that the tax on savings is not an available instrument.
19Equivalently, we assume that Ri = 1 8i. The absence of an annuity market consists
of another major second best feature of the framework studied in this section.
20A rate below 100 % would complicate the analysis without a¤ecting the qualitative
results of this paper.
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Hence, the budget constraint of the government can be written as:X
ni (T + i (ei)P ) =
X
ni [wili + (1  i (ei)) si + ei] (13)
Having introduced the components of our model, the problem faced by an
agent of type i is the following. In the rst period, the agent works, invests
in health and saves for the second period. Then, in the second period, if
still alive, the agent consumes his savings and the pension benet. Thus, the
problem of an agent of type i can be written as:
max
s;e;l
u
 
ci   l2i =2

+ i (ei)u (di)
s.to

ci + si + ei (1 + ) 6 wili (1  ) + T
di  si + P
We suppose a zero interest rate. If there is no liquidity constraint, the opti-
mality conditions are
u0 (xi) = i (ei)u0 (di) (14)
li = wi (1  ) (15)
(1 + )u0 (xi) = 0i (ei)u (di) (16)
Expressions (14) and (16) determine the optimal levels of savings si and
of health expenditures ei chosen by an agent of type i. Note that for any
 2 [0; 1[, the levels of health expenditures and of savings are lower than if
the agent were not myopic (i.e.  = 1). Replacing the optimal level of e¤ort
ei and savings s

i , agent is utility function can be rewritten as:
u
 
w2i (1  )2
2
+ T   si   ei (1 + )
!
+ i (e

i )u (s

i + P )
As mentioned above, the social planner is assumed to be of a utilitarian
- but paternalistic - type. Paternalism is justied so as to correct agents
self-control problem.
In the present context, the social planners problem can be expressed by
the following Lagrangian expression:
$ =
P
i ni
h
u

w2i (1 )2
2
  si   ei (1 + ) + T

+ i (ei)u (s

i + P )
+ [(1   (ei)) si + ei + w2i (1  )  T   i (ei)P ]]
where  is the multiplier associated with the budget constraint and the vari-
able si and e

i are functions of policy tools through (4)-(6).
11
Di¤erentiating this expression and substituting for the FOCs describing
optimal savings and optimal health expenditures yields:
@$
@
=  E u0 (x)w2 (1  ) + (1  )E  (e)u0 (d) @s
@
+ 0 (e)u (d)
@e
@

+E

( 0 (e) (s+ P ) + ) @e

@
+ w2 (1  2) + (1   (e)) @s

i
@

@$
@
=  E [u0 (x) e] + (1  )E

 (e)u0 (d)
@s
@
+ 0 (e)u (d)
@e
@

+E

( 0 (e) (s+ P ) + ) @e

@
+ e + (1   (e)) @s

@

@$
@T
= Eu0 (x) + (1  )E

 (e)u0 (d)
@s
@T
+ 0 (e)u (d)
@e
@T

+E

( 0 (e) (s+ P ) + ) @e

@T
+ (1   (e)) @s

@T
  1

@$
@P
= E [ (e)u0 (d)] + (1  )E

 (e)u0 (d)
@s
@P
+ 0 (e)u (d)
@e
@P

+E

( 0 (e) (s + P ) + ) @e

@P
+ (1   (e)) @s

@P
   (e)

where we used the expectation operator E(:) to simplify notations.
Setting those expressions to zero allows us to deduce the optimal values of
our policy tools. Note that the transfers T and P are closely related. Hence,
to keep the analysis simple, we shall study them separately, and thus consider
rst the optimal values of two pairs of instruments ( ; T ) and ( ; P ) : Then,
we shall study the optimal tax-transfer  on health spending.
4.1 Payroll taxation compensated by rst period de-
mogrant
We assume here that payroll taxation funds a rst period uniform benet
T .21 Dening the compensated Lagrangian as:
@ ~$
@
=
@$
@
+
@$
@T
dT
d
21To simplify the presentation, we shall assume, in this subsection, that  = 0.
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one obtains,
@ ~$
@
=  cov  u0 (x) ;w2 (1  )  Eu0 (x)Ew2
+(1  )

E (e)u0 (d)
@~s
@
+ E0 (e)u (d)
@~e
@

+

E ( 0 (e) (s+ P )) @~e
@
+ E (1   (e)) @~s
@

Setting that expression to zero and solving yields:

1   =
 cov (u0 (x) ; w2) + 1 
1 

E (e)u0 (d) @~s
@
+ E0 (e)u (d) @~e
@

+ 
1 

E ( 0 (e) (s+ P )) @~e
@
+ E (1   (e)) @~s
@

Eu0 (x)Ew2
(17)
Note that if  = 1 (individuals are perfectly rational), that expression col-
lapses to:

1   =
 cov (u0 (x) ;w2)  
1 E (
0 (e) (s+ P )) @~e
@
+ 
1 E (1   (e)) @~s@
Eu0 (x)Ew2
(18)
The denominator of (18) is the standard e¢ ciency term. It depends on
the derivative of labour supply with respect to the tax. With a quadratic
labour disutility and a quasi linear utility function, the derivative of the
labour supply with respect to  is  w2i (1  ).
The rst term in the numerator is the standard equity term and is positive
since cov (u0 (x) ;w2) is generally negative (as the level of earnings and the
marginal utility of rst period consumption are negatively correlated). If
u (x) was linear, there would be no redistributive objective and this term
would cancel out.
The second term represents the negative e¤ect of living longer on the
governments revenue. A higher e¤ort increases aggregate pensions and de-
creases the number of accidental bequests (which we assumed to be taxed
at 100%). This e¤ect was rst highlighted by Becker and Philipson (1998):
if the payroll tax combined with a lump sum transfer leads to more health
expenditures (@~e=@ > 0), then it should be lower than in the absence of
such an e¤ect.
The third term is the e¤ect of the tax-transfer policy on the size of savings,
and, thus, on the revenue generated by accidental bequests. If @~s=@ < 0
(as we expect), the optimal tax  should be lower under the presence of the
taxation of unintended bequests than in the absence of this ( (e) = 1).
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To sum up, assuming that @~s=@ < 0 and @~e=@ > 0, our redistributive
payroll tax will be depressed by its negative revenue e¤ect on both total
pensions to be paid [i.e.  (ei)P ], and on the number and size of accidental
bequests [i.e. (1   (ei)) s].
Let us now consider the general expression (17), where the degree of
rationality  di¤ers from 1. This equation shows that having myopic agents
in this framework has non trivial consequences on the level of the optimal
tax rate. Actually, with  < 1, there are now two additional Pigouvian
terms in the numerator, aimed at correcting agentss myopia. Remind that
an imperfect rationality makes agents under-invest in their health and under-
save. Hence, if a rise in income taxation compensated by a higher T makes
people save even less (i.e. @~s=@ < 0), this does not play in favor of a
larger tax rate, as this would reinforce under-saving. However, if a rise in
income taxation makes agents spend more on health (i.e. @~e=@ > 0), this
contributes to correct the under-investment in health. Given that @~s=@ < 0
calls for a lower tax and @~e=@ > 0 for a higher tax, the overall sign of that
additional term is unknown, and depends on the absolute values of @~s=@
and @~e=@ , as well as on the marginal utility gains from correcting the two
e¤ects of myopia: i (ei)u0 (di) versus 0i (ei)u (di).
In interpreting our formulae, we make here a number of assumptions con-
cerning the sign of compensated elasticities: @~s=@ < 0 and @~e=@ > 0,
and, below, @~s=@ > 0 and @~e=@ < 0. With the exception of the elastic-
ity @~e=@, whose negative sign seems obvious, those assumptions should be
merely regarded as a priori plausible postulates. We would denitely need
more information about utility functions to check how realistic they are. Note
also that whether payroll taxation nances T or P does matter. When a pay-
roll tax nances pension benets, it is expected to have a depressive e¤ect
on saving. On the contrary, when it nances rst period benet, things are
less clear.
Note also that we use here a particular denition of compensation that
departs from the standard denition of Slutsky e¤ects. The compensation is
here aggregate and not individual. This also should incite one to caution in
interpreting our compensated elasticities.
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4.2 Income taxation compensated by a Beveridgian
pension
Doing the same exercise as above but with the pension benet P , we now
express the optimal value for the tax rate as22

(1  ) =
264  cov ( (e
)u0 (d) ; w2) + (1  )E [ (e)u0 (d)w2]
+ (1 )
(1 )

E (e)u0 (d) @~s

@
+ E0 (e)u (d) @~e

@

+ 
(1 )

E ( 0 (e) (s+ P )) @~e
@
+ E (1   (e)) @~s
@

375
E [ (e)u0 (d)]Ew2
(19)
Under no myopia ( = 1), we have:

1   =
  cov ( (e)u0 (d) ; w2) + (1  )E [ (e)u0 (d)w2]
+ 
(1 )

E ( 0 (e) (s+ P )) @~e
@
+ E (1   (e)) @~s
@
 
E [ (e)u0 (d)]Ew2
(20)
In comparison with (18), that is with the case of payroll taxation nancing
a uniform rst-period benet, there is here in (20) an additional term, which
is the second term of the numerator. This term increases as  decreases, that
is, as more private savings is wastedas accidental bequests. It reects the
fact that the collective annuitization implicit in the pension scheme is much
more attractive with a low  than with a high . Clearly, it represents an
additional argument in favor of a positive  :
Under the presence of myopia, there are two additional terms in the nu-
merator of (19), which, as above, are of Pigouvian nature and aim at cor-
recting agentss tendency to under-save and under-invest in health because
of their myopia. Note that the term related to collective annuitization is also
inuenced negatively by . Myopia and low survival probability have here
the same e¤ect: they both make collective annuitization more desirable.
4.3 Taxing or subsidizing longevity
Using the same approach as in the previous subsection, we now consider the
optimal level of health taxation  along with the rst period demogrant T .23
Combining the FOCs of the planners problem relative to  and T , and
dening the compensated Lagrangian as:
@ ~$
@
=
@$
@
+
@$
@T
e
22As in the previous subsection, we assume here  = 0.
23For the ease of presentation, we now assume here that  = 0.
15
It can be shown that the optimal tax on health expenditures has the
following form:
 =
  cov (u0 (x) ; e) + (1  )E  (e)u0 (d) @~s
@
+ 0 (e)u (d) @~e
@

 E (0 (e) (s+ P )) @~e
@
+ E (1   (e)) @~s
@

 E @~e
@
(21)
In the case where  = 1, that expression collapses to:
 =
 cov (u0 (x) ; e)  E (0 (e) (s+ P )) @~e
@
+ E (1   (e)) @~s
@
 E @~e
@
(22)
Let us rst interpret expression (22), which concerns the case where agents
are perfectly rational. To make the interpretation easy, we shall assume here
that taxing health spendings reduces those spendings (i.e. @~e=@ < 0), but
favours savings (i.e. @~s=@ > 0), which is quite plausible.
The denominator reects the e¢ ciency concerns and is positive when
@~e=@ < 0. In the numerator, the second and third terms are positive, and
represent the impact of taxing health on government revenue through its
impact on savings and on e¤ort. As in the preceding section, taxing e¤ort
both increases the number of accidental bequests and decreases the number
of pensions to be paid (second term); the last term represents the gain in
revenue due to the increase in the size of accidental bequests. However, the
covariance cov (u0 (x) ; e), which represents the redistributive objective, has
an unclear sign. If cov (u0 (x) ; e) < 0, it follows that  > 0, so that the agent
faces a tax; but if cov (u0 (x) ; e) > 0,  7 0, and it might happen that agents
benet from a subsidy on health.
The sign of cov (u0 (x) ; e) depends on the correlation between w and " and
on the functional relation between e and " in  (e; "). In the benchmark sit-
uation where w and " are positively correlated and e and " are complements,
we can expect the covariance cov (u0 (x) ; e) to be negative: more productive
agents will spend more on health, so that u0(x) and e are negatively corre-
lated. Alternatively, if we allow e and " to close substitutes, it is possible, if
(e; ") exhibits decreasing returns to scale, that a higher " makes more pro-
ductive agents choose a lower e¤ort e, so that the chosen e is here negatively
correlated to w, implying that the covariance cov (u0 (x) ; e) is positive.24
Turning now to the general formula with  < 1, there are two additional
Pigouvian terms, which, if @~e=@ < 0 and @~s=@ > 0, play in opposite
24Take the case of 2 agents (w2 > w1 > 0; "2 > "1 = 0) and assume  ("i + ei) : Assume
further that 1 (0) = 0, 01 (0) = 1; 2("2) = 1; 02("2) = 0: One expects e1 > 0 and
e2 = 0:
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directions. If taxing e¤ort enhances savings, @~s=@ > 0, then the presence
of myopia leading to under-saving is an additional motive for taxing health
expenditures. On the contrary, if taxing e¤orts reduces e¤ort (i.e. @~e=@ <
0), then such a tax would not correct at all the myopia, but reinforce it.
Hence, the overall impact of myopia on the optimal level of the tax on health
spending is ambiguous.
To sum up, let us compare the tax on earnings with the tax on health ex-
penditures under the assumptions: cov (u0 (x) ; w2) < 0, @~s=@ < 0, @~e=@ >
0, @~s=@ > 0 and @~e=@ < 0, and under cov (u0 (x) ; e) ? 0. If all agents
are identical, that is, if there is no redistributive concern, we expect a tax
on health and a subsidy on earnings. However, as soon as agents di¤er, we
reintroduce the covariance terms, and, in the benchmark situation, we get
positive taxes on earnings and on health.25
Note that substitutability between genetics and e¤ort is important; but
the relative importance of these two factors in the production of  matters
also. To see that, let us take two extreme examples: e = 0 and " = 0: In
the rst case,  is exogenous but di¤ers across agents. Hence, in that case,
e = 0, and tax policy is restricted to redistribution and to stimulating saving.
In the second case, where genetics plays no role, most results obtained above
remain true, but it becomes impossible for the cov (u0 (x) ; e) to be positive.26
5 Conclusions
The goal of this paper was to study the optimal tax-transfer policy in an
economy where longevity depends on individual behavior when being young
and on an exogenous characteristic (e.g. genetic background). For that
purpose, we considered a two-period model, where the population di¤ers in
productivity and genes, and where the probability of survival to the second
period depends on rst-period health spending and on inherited genes.
We showed that, under Benthamite utilitarianism, the social optimum can
be decentralized by means of redistributive lump sum transfers and Pigouvian
taxes correcting for agentss myopia - under-saving and under-investment in
health - and for their incapacity to perceive the e¤ect of health spending on
the resource constraint.
The second-best problem was studied in three stages. In a rst stage
25If e and " are substituables, cov (u0 (x) ; e) > 0, and we have a positive or a negative
tax on health.
26Clearly, if only e¤ort can enhance longevity, more productive agents do not spend less
on health than less productive agent, as there exists, under " = 0, no way to compensate
low health e¤ort in longevity terms.
17
devoted to the optimal income taxation compensated by rst-period lump
sum transfer, it was shown that the redistributive motive supporting income
taxation tends to be depressed by its negative revenue e¤ect on both total
pensions to be paid and on the amount of accidental bequests. Moreover,
myopia has here an ambiguous e¤ect on the optimal tax level, as a rise in
income tax may well raise the (too low) health expenditures, but may also
lower the (already too low) savings even more. The second stage, devoted to
optimal income taxation compensated by second-period pension, allowed us
to identify an additional determinant of optimal income tax, reecting the
fact that the collective annuitization implicit in the pension scheme is more
attractive with a low average longevity than with a high average longevity.
Finally, it was shown that the optimal tax on health spending depends on the
covariance between the marginal utility of consumption and health spending,
and, thus, on the complementarity between genes and e¤ort in the production
of longevity, on their importance as inputs in that production process, as well
as on the correlation between genetic background and productivity.
In sum, our tax policy analysis reveals the crucial role played by de-
terminants that are usually absent in the context of economies with xed
longevities: the roles of genes and e¤ort (and their interactions) in the pro-
duction of longevity, and the correlation between genetic background and
productivity. Given the imperfect knowledge of those crucial pieces of infor-
mation, it cannot be overemphasized that this study gives us only a - purely
theoretical - clue regarding the design of the optimal taxation policy in the
environment under study.
Moreover, even on the theoretical side, this study su¤ers from several
weaknesses, which invite further research and, at least, much caution. First,
on the ethical side, this study relied on the standard utilitarian approach,
which should only be regarded as a rst approximation in the context of
endogenous longevity. Second, when considering the second-best problem,
we assumed that all agents are equally myopic, which is a strong assumption,
as we may expect more productive agents to be also more informed on the
survival function. Third, this study focused on a static economy with a
xed heterogeneity, whereas the heterogeneity of the population is likely to
evolve over time. Given that the social planner would like to internalize the
composition e¤ectsof agentsdecisions on the composition of future cohorts,
the optimal long-run policy may depend on the dynamics of transmission of
genes and productivities, and might thus di¤er from the optimal policy under
a xed partition.
Those few remarks su¢ ce to show that much work remains to be done,
in the future, to have a better idea of the optimal scal policy in an economy
where longevity is inuenced by factors on which agents have some control,
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and by factors on which they have no control at all.
To conclude, one might nd shocking the likely conclusion that health
spendings should be taxed and not subsidized. This is at odds with the
usual recommendation that health care should be subsidized for various rea-
sons: redistribution, paternalism, externalities, etc. Nonetheless, this result
can be explained by the fact that here most redistribution is implemented
by the income taxation. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that health
expenditures are, in our model, pure longevity-enhancing spendings, which
a¤ect welfare only through increasing the length of life, while leaving the
quality of each period lived unchanged. Undoubtedly, this restriction leaves
aside various motives for subsidizing health care.
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